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INTRODUCTION 
The statement of jurisdiction, issues presented for review 
and standards of review, statement of the case, and facts have 
all been previously presented. (Brief of Appellants) Appellants 
present this brief in reply to issues raised by the Appellee in 
its brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. A MILITARY SEPARATION PAYMENT MADE UNDER §1174 AND 
RELATED STATUTES IS NOT A PENSION OR RETIREMENT PAYMENT 
AND SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS SUCH UNDER A DECREE OF 
DIVORCE. 
Separation pay from the military is not a retirement payment 
and should not be treated as retirement under A Decree of 
Divorce. The applicable portion of the August 16, 1989 Divorce 
Decree awarded Marion Marsh "ll/40ths of all pension and 
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retirement benefits that the [Mr. Marsh] may receive upon his 
retirement from military service." Appellee contends that since 
"marital property ^encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever 
source derived" including pension funds and insurance," Gardner 
v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)(quoting Englert v. 
Enqlert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978)), this is intended to include 
military separation pay. 
Appellee continues that "the essential criterion is whether 
a right to the benefit has accrued in whole or in part during the 
marriage." Mr. Marsh did not earn his separation "in whole or in 
part" during the marriage. He earned the separation pay when he 
was involuntarily separated from the military in November 1991. 
At that time he was given the separation pay to assist him in his 
re-entry into civilian life. 
Under the statute, 10 U.S.C. §1174(h), in the event that 
the individual receiving separation pay eventually qualifies for 
retirement, the amount of the separation pay must be repaid. The 
statute does not state that this is an advancement on retirement 
as the Appellee implies or as her expert opines. The statute 
provides only that if the individual receives Retirement he must 
repay the separation pay. Appellee also raises the issue of 
the entry of the separation pay as Retirement/Pension on Mr. 
Marsh's W-2 form. Tax forms do not contain a place to enter 
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Military Separation Pay and according to Mr. Crist, Appellee's 
Expert Witness, the Retirement/Pension line is where Mr. Marsh 
was likely instructed to list that amount. 
The Appellee implies that since Mr. Marsh has completed his 
requisite years of service with the military that he is entitled 
to retirement. What she fails to address, however, is that Mr. 
Marsh still must live to the age of 65 before he becomes eligible 
for any retirement benefits. If he receives these benefits, then 
at that time, Mrs. Marsh will be entitled to ll/40ths of the 
retirement. 
Because Mr. Marsh turning age 65 was the agreed upon time 
that Mrs. Marsh would receive retirement, based upon current 
information she will, at that time, receive ll/40ths of the total 
$1800 which totals $495 per month. With Mr. Marsh repaying 75% 
of the retirement, he will receive $495 each month which can be 
paid to Mrs. Marsh to compensate her accordingly. This appears 
to be the appropriate solution because Appellee is only entitled 
to the retirement if Mr. Marsh completes the requisite years of 
service and if he reaches retirement age. If he does not meet 
these requirements, he will not receive retirement benefits and 
should not be required to pay benefits to Mrs. Marsh prior to 
receiving them. 
Appellee argues that without the separation pay she will 
suffer "an enormous hardship and injustice." Because the Divorce 
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Decree granted the retirement only should Mr. Marsh receive it, 
she has no interest in that retirement until that time. Mr. 
Marsh is not arguing that Appellee is not entitled to her 
ll/40ths of the retirement, only that she be given her share of 
the benefits if and when he receives them. 
Although Appellee argues that Appellant "will receive 
retirement benefits," that is not the case. Although he has 
currently completed the requisite years of service, he has not 
reached the age of 65 and will not reach that age for a number of 
years. His retirement is contingent upon his reaching that age 
and is not, as Appellee states, a foregone conclusion. 
Appellee indicated that in the case of Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 
222 Cal. Rptr. 644, (Cal. App. 2d 1986), cert, denied 479 U.S. 
885, the employee had not completed 20 years of service to 
entitle him to retirement and as noted, Mr. Marsh has currently 
completed the requisite years of service. However, as noted 
above Mr. Marsh has not "earned his longevity pension" because he 
is not entitled to such pension unless or until he reaches the 
age of 65. 
Since separation pay is generally separate property, 
Appellee is not entitled to receive ll/40ths of the separation 
pay. Since Mr. Marsh has currently fulfilled his requisite years 
of service he is one step closer to receiving retirement. 
However, he is not entitled to receive those retirement benefits 
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unless or until he reaches the age of 65. Should that event 
occur, Appellee will then be entitled to receive her ll/40ths of 
the retirement pay. Since the amount paid to Mr. Marsh was 
separation pay as a part of his involuntary discharge, the 
reasoning used in the Kuzmiak case should be applied to determine 
that separation pay is not compensation for past services and is 
consequently not divisible in the divorce decree. 
POINT II. IF APPELLEE RECEIVES 11/40THS OF THE MILITARY 
SEPARATION PAY SHE MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE 
REPAYMENT IN THE EVENT THAT MR. MARSH RECEIVES HIS 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
Equity requires that Mrs. Marsh be required to participate 
in the repayment if she receives part of the separation pay. If 
she receives her ll/40ths of the separation pay, she should be 
required to repay ll/40ths when and if she receives retirement 
benefits. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
OBLIGATION FOR MR. MARSH TO HOLD APPELLEE HARMLESS 
ON THE MORTGAGE WAS CONTINGENT ON HIS PAYMENT OF 
CHILD SUPPORT. 
The Decree of Divorce awarded child support and alimony to 
Appellee. The Decree also ordered Appellee to hold Appellant 
harmless on the mortgage for their marital home. As a result of 
Appellee's failure to do so, Mr. Marsh or someone on his behalf 
must repay the Department of Veteran's Affairs the sum of 
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$12,870.96 before the Appellant can once again be eligible for 
Veteran's loans. Although, as Appellee noted, "the outstanding 
debt on the home was waived by the Veteran's Administration,'' Mr. 
Marsh has been damaged and not held harmless in that he is 
precluded from obtaining any type of Veteran's loans until this 
amount is paid off. 
As courts have found in child support and visitation cases, 
separate obligations such as visitation and child support are not 
contingent upon one another. In addition, the Divorce Decree 
expressly provided Mrs. Marsh a remedy in the event of an 
arrearage in support payments. The Decree states "if the 
Defendant falls thirty (30) days or more in arrears in his child 
support obligation, the Plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory 
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (78-
45(d) (1) et. seq.) (1984 as amended)." The Decree does not permit 
or provide her justification to evade her obligations under the 
Decree nor does it make meeting her obligations contingent upon 
his. 
In addition, Appellee failed to note that as of the date of 
trial, Mr. Marsh had paid all his arrearages, including interest, 
and has made Mrs. Marsh whole. Mr. Marsh is entitled to the 
same. It is Appellee's obligation to make Mr. Marsh whole by 
repaying the debt of $12,870.96. Mr. Marsh has remained current 
in his support. He has fulfilled all his obligations under the 
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Divorce Decree and is entitled to the same fulfillment of 
obligations from Mrs. Marsh. It would be inequitable to require 
Mr. Marsh to remain current on his obligations and not require 
the same from Appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and enter judgment in favor of Mr. Marsh since 
Military Separation Pay is not the same as retirement and 
consequently should not be divided as retirement under the decree 
of divorce. In the alternative, if the Separation pay is divided 
under the Decree, Appellee should be required to contribute to 
the repayment of such in the event of Mr. Marsh receiving 
retirement. Finally, Appellee should be required to uphold her 
Dbligation to hold Mr. Marsh harmless on their mortgage and 
should be required to repay the Veteran's Affairs loan so that 
yir. Marsh is again made whole and has the opportunity to again 
obtain a Veteran's Affairs loan. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this luftj Day of August, 1998. 
RICHARD N. BIGELOW 
By: 
Richard K. Bigelow (39&I/) 
Attorney for Appellant 
7 
